Decision-makers’ guide to deploying blockchain safely in 2025: how to build CI/CD for smart contracts, choose production‑grade key management (KMS, HSM, MPC, multisig/AA), and design real rollback and “undo” playbooks in a post‑Pectra, post‑SELFDESTRUCT world. Includes concrete pipelines, configs, and runbooks you can ship this quarter.

Blockchain deployment tools in 2025: CI/CD, Key Management, and Rollback Strategies

Ethereum changed materially in 2024–2025. Pectra activated on May 7, 2025 (epoch 364,032), shipping EIP‑7702 (programmable EOAs) and other items; calldata repricing (EIP‑7623) also landed, and SELFDESTRUCT was curtailed by EIP‑6780 earlier, breaking recreate‑at‑same‑address patterns. These shifts affect how you test, sign, deploy, and “roll back” production contracts. (blog.ethereum.org)

This guide distills how teams at both startups and enterprises should structure CI/CD, keys, and rollbacks for 2025-era chains, with specific, reproducible steps.

1) CI/CD that anticipates Pectra, 4337, and 7702

Your pipeline should do more than build-and-deploy. It must: enforce storage‑layout compatibility; fuzz invariants; simulate upgrades and user flows (4337 and 7702); verify code on explorers; and ship signed, attestable artifacts.

Recommended toolchain:

Build/test: Foundry (forge/cast/anvil) or Hardhat 3.0+. Hardhat’s verification plugin supports Etherscan, Blockscout, Sourcify; Foundry’s verify commands integrate with Etherscan V2. (hardhat.org)
Upgrade checks: OpenZeppelin Upgrades Plugin (Hardhat/Foundry) validates upgrade safety and tracks implementations (.openzeppelin files for Hardhat). (docs.openzeppelin.com)
Static analysis + fuzzing: Slither (upgradeability checks), Echidna invariants. (github.com)
Simulation at scale: Tenderly Simulations/DevNets, including state overrides and bundled simulations; use its RPC or API in CI for pre‑broadcast dry runs. (docs.tenderly.co)
Types and SDKs: TypeChain to generate types for Ethers/Viem clients. (github.com)
Supply‑chain integrity: GitHub Artifact Attestations + Sigstore Cosign v3 to sign build outputs (ABIs, bytecode, deploy scripts). (docs.github.com)

Example: GitHub Actions pipeline (Foundry + Hardhat verify + attestations)

name: contracts-ci
on:
  push:
    branches: [main]
  pull_request:

permissions:
  id-token: write   # OIDC for cloud KMS or attestation
  contents: read

jobs:
  test-and-verify:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - name: Set up Foundry
        uses: foundry-rs/foundry-toolchain@v1
        with: { version: latest }

      - name: Install Node and deps (for Hardhat tasks/verify)
        uses: actions/setup-node@v4
        with: { node-version: '22' }
      - run: npm ci

      - name: Build & unit tests (Foundry)
        run: |
          forge build
          forge test -vvv --ffi --gas-report

      - name: Storage layout check vs previous
        run: |
          forge inspect src/MyUpgradeable.sol:MyUpgradeable storage-layout > layout.new.json
          git show origin/main:layout.mainnet.json > layout.old.json || true
          diff -u layout.old.json layout.new.json || true  # fail via policy if mismatch

      - name: Slither upgradeability checks
        uses: trailofbits/gh-action-slither@v1
        with:
          target: .
          slither-args: --checklist --filter-paths node_modules
        continue-on-error: false

      - name: Echidna invariants (short CI run)
        run: docker run --rm -v "$PWD":/code ghcr.io/crytic/echidna /bin/bash -lc \
          "cd /code && echidna-test . --config echidna.yaml --test-mode assertion --corpus-dir corpus-ci --seq-len 50 --test-limit 2000"

      - name: Pre-broadcast simulation bundle (Tenderly)
        env:
          TENDERLY_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.TENDERLY_KEY }}
          TENDERLY_ACCOUNT: ${{ secrets.TENDERLY_ACCOUNT }}
          TENDERLY_PROJECT: ${{ secrets.TENDERLY_PROJECT }}
        run: node scripts/simulate-bundle.js  # uses tenderly-sdk

      - name: Deploy to Sepolia (dry-run broadcast)
        run: forge script script/Deploy.s.sol:Deploy --rpc-url ${{ secrets.SEPOLIA_RPC }} --broadcast --fork-url ${{ secrets.SEPOLIA_RPC }} --legacy

      - name: Verify on Etherscan
        run: |
          npx hardhat verify --network sepolia $ADDRESS "arg1" "arg2"
          forge verify-contract --watch --chain sepolia $ADDRESS src/MyUpgradeable.sol:MyUpgradeable --verifier etherscan --etherscan-api-key ${{ secrets.ETHERSCAN_KEY }}

      - name: Generate attestation for build artifacts
        uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@v4
      - run: |
          cosign attest --predicate sbom.json --type cyclonedx --yes ghcr.io/OWNER/REPO/contracts:${{ github.sha }}

Hardhat verification and Foundry’s
```
verify-contract
```
are both supported and reduce flakes due to explorer API changes. (hardhat.org)
Use Tenderly’s Simulation API or
```
tenderly_simulateBundle
```
RPC to dry‑run transactions and upgrades against mainnet state before you spend gas. (docs.tenderly.co)
Artifact attestations and Cosign v3 make build provenance auditable with GitHub’s native attestation format and Sigstore bundles. (docs.github.com)

Post‑Pectra test cases to add

Type‑4 (7702) transactions with authorization lists; ensure wallets/SDKs accept and estimators behave. (ethereum.org)
Calldata‑heavy flows: measure cost deltas after EIP‑7623; refactor to blobs or compress calldata. (eips.ethereum.org)
SELFDESTRUCT assumptions in deploy scripts: remove any “redeploy‑same‑address after selfdestruct” tricks; they break under EIP‑6780. (eips.ethereum.org)

2) Production key management: KMS/HSM, MPC, multisig, AA

There’s no single “best” option; most resilient stacks combine at least two of the following.

A. Cloud KMS/HSM signers for EOAs or relayers

AWS KMS supports ECC_SECG_P256K1; AWS CloudHSM supports secp256k1 via JCE/PKCS#11. (docs.aws.amazon.com)
Azure Key Vault supports ES256K (P‑256K) for signing; GCP KMS has community signers for secp256k1. (learn.microsoft.com)
HashiCorp Vault can host secp256k1 with Kaleido’s plugin to expose an “Ethereum HSM‑like” API. (github.com)
YubiHSM 2 (FIPS 140‑2 L3) supports secp256k1 if you prefer on‑prem hardware with PKCS#11. (csrc.nist.gov)

Use OIDC from GitHub Actions to get short‑lived cloud credentials (no static secrets), then call KMS to sign deployment/relay txs. Azure, GCP, and AWS patterns rely on workload identity federation. (docs.github.com)

Practical policy:

Root keys (treasury, ownership) in HSM/managed HSM; deployment/bot keys in KMS with tight IAM; no raw private keys in CI.
Enforce receiver whitelists and EIP‑1559 price policies on relayers; set nonce “validUntil” to avoid stuck nonces. If you still use OpenZeppelin Defender Relayers, note the hosted service is sunsetting July 1, 2026—plan migration to their OSS Relayer/Monitor or alternatives. (docs.openzeppelin.com)

B. Multisig and smart accounts (Safe, 4337 AA, 7702)

Safe remains the de‑facto operational multisig. Its Safe{Core} SDKs provide Protocol/API/Relay kits and integrate with 4337; transaction service API now enforces authenticated endpoints with rate limits—update your infra. (docs.safe.global)
For “gasless UX,” pair Safe or other smart accounts with 4337 bundlers and paymasters; wallet/app integration of paymasters is governed by ERC‑7677. (docs.erc4337.io)
Pectra’s EIP‑7702 gives EOAs temporary smart‑wallet powers via transaction type‑4 delegation—great for phased upgrades or batched admin ops without migrating the address. Add type‑4 tests and policies. (ethereum.org)

C. MPC (threshold signing) for institutional custody

Mature offerings implement threshold ECDSA; Fireblocks’ MPC‑CMP (open‑sourced) reduces round trips and supports cold‑share configurations. Coinbase’s cb‑mpc is another open implementation. Evaluate round complexity, HSM attestation (e.g., SGX), and rotation SLAs. (github.com)

Recommended blends by product type:

Consumer apps with frequent transactions: AA smart accounts on an L2 + paymaster, with a Safe‑based admin multisig for upgrades and funds.
Enterprise/finserv: HSM/KMS‑anchored EOAs for relayers, MPC or Safe for treasury controls, and a timelocked Governor for on‑chain changes.

3) Upgrade and rollback strategies that actually work on chain

There is no global “undo” on a public chain. Design for controlled upgrades and rapid isolation.

A. Choose the right upgrade pattern

UUPS vs Transparent proxies: both are supported by OpenZeppelin’s plugins; UUPS reduces proxy admin surface but requires robust
```
_authorizeUpgrade
```
. Beacon proxies can upgrade many instances atomically. Follow ERC‑1967 storage slots. (docs.openzeppelin.com)
Diamonds (ERC‑2535) let you swap facets to bypass the 24KB limit and compose modules. Consider if your system needs many function sets and fine‑grained facet control. (eips.ethereum.org)

Storage safety gates:

Run storage‑layout diffs with
```
forge inspect ... storage-layout
```
. Add Slither’s upgradeability checks (constant flips, missing variables, function ID collisions) to CI. (github.com)

B. Governance and timelocks with emergency brakes

Place upgrade authority behind a Safe and a TimelockController, or a Governor with Timelock. Set roles so only the timelock executes, and add a short‑fuse “guardian” to pause in emergencies. (docs.openzeppelin.com)

Typical wiring:

Proxy owner = TimelockController
Timelock proposer = Governor (or Safe‑owned module)
Emergency Pauser = separate Safe with narrowly scoped rights

C. Canary and staged rollouts on chain

Gate features behind allowlists/feature flags; enable for a small cohort first. In AA wallets, use session keys/spending limits; in ERC‑6900/7579 modular accounts, load modules incrementally. (eips.ethereum.org)
For rollups/apps with many contracts, deploy a “shadow” instance reading the same or bridged state and route a slice of traffic (front‑end or off‑chain router) before switching.

D. Concrete rollback playbook (works with proxies)

Detect: on‑chain monitor flags anomalies; simulations replicate failure path.
Contain: call
```
pause()
```
on affected modules; set feature flags to off; cut front‑end routes to the new facet/impl.
Revert code:
```
upgradeProxy
```
back to previous implementation address pre‑recorded in your .openzeppelin/ChangeLog, or perform a
```
diamondCut
```
to restore prior facet selectors. (github.com)
Data fix (if needed): deploy a “Fixer” implementation with only migration methods authorized, or a script that executes corrective calls via timelock; document exact state diffs from simulation traces.
Audit and unpause: ship a post‑mortem, retain a signed bundle of artifacts and attestations for IR and regulators.

Caveat: “Selfdestruct + CREATE2” to recycle addresses is no longer viable in production; EIP‑6780 removed general deletion semantics. Don’t rely on address reuse for rollback. (eips.ethereum.org)

4) Post‑Pectra realities you must encode into CI and ops

EIP‑7702 (type‑4): Add tests that your admin wallets and relayers can construct and submit authorization lists, and your policies don’t reject them. Keep a 4337 fallback path for earlier tooling. (ethereum.org)
EIP‑7623 (calldata floor): Track gas exposure for calldata‑heavy methods. If you embed proofs/calldata, move to blobs where possible. We’ve observed 5–15% gas deltas on some swap routers; your mileage varies. (eips.ethereum.org)
Tooling parity: upgrade solc targets to Prague/Pectra as your default EVM; ensure Hardhat/Foundry versions match explorer verifier expectations. EF’s Pectra post lists client versions and activation details. (blog.ethereum.org)

5) Two reference blueprints you can adopt now

A. Startup shipping an L2 consumer app in 6–8 weeks

Accounts/UX: Safe‑based smart accounts with 4337 bundler + paymaster (sponsored actions), with a minimal 7702 path for EOA users who decline AA. (docs.safe.global)
CI steps: Foundry tests, Slither/Echidna gates, Tenderly pre‑broadcast simulation bundles for key flows, Etherscan verify, SBOM + Cosign attestation. (docs.tenderly.co)
Keys: relayer signer in cloud KMS via OIDC; admin multisig in Safe; no private keys in CI. (docs.aws.amazon.com)
Upgrades: UUPS proxies with Timelock owner; guardian Safe can pause. Add allowlist flags for new features. (docs.openzeppelin.com)

B. Enterprise protocol with multiple upgradable modules

Architecture: Diamond (ERC‑2535) for modularity; or a fleet of UUPS proxies per module if audit familiarity is a priority. (eips.ethereum.org)
Governance: Governor + Timelock + Safe; upgrade proposals queued and executed by timelock; emergency canceller role separated. (docs.openzeppelin.com)
Keys: HSM for treasury and timelock admin; KMS for bots; optional MPC for hot/warm wallets with audited vendor. (docs.aws.amazon.com)
Monitoring/Sim: Tenderly node/Sim API to “dry‑run” upgrades, and to replay failed prod txs with state overrides; alerts wired to PagerDuty. (docs.tenderly.co)
Runbooks: documented “revert facet/impl” and “data patch” procedures with pre‑frozen implementation addresses and scripts.

6) Practical snippets you’ll actually reuse

Hardhat verify + programmatic call

import hre from "hardhat";
import { verifyContract } from "@nomicfoundation/hardhat-verify/verify";

await verifyContract({
  address: "0xYourProxyOrImpl",
  constructorArgs: ["arg1"],
  provider: "etherscan",
}, hre);

This mirrors the

verify

task and works across Etherscan/Blockscout/Sourcify. (hardhat.org)

Foundry verify

forge verify-contract \
  --watch --chain mainnet \
  0xYourAddress src/My.sol:My \
  --verifier etherscan --etherscan-api-key $ETHERSCAN_KEY

Foundry supports multichain verification via Etherscan V2 and custom verifier URLs. (docs.etherscan.io)

Safe CLI in CI for approval/proposals

docker run -it --rm safeglobal/safe-cli safe-cli 0xYourSafe $RPC_URL <<'EOF'
# inside CLI: propose tx to upgrade proxy via ProxyAdmin
EOF

Use “blockchain mode” for direct chain ops or “tx-service mode” when Safe Transaction Service is available. Note API auth and rate‑limit changes in 2025. (pypi.org)

Timelock wiring reminder

Timelock proposer = Governor, executor = anyone (or Governor), admin = timelock itself; proxy ownership set to timelock. Avoid leaving admin privileges on EOAs. (docs.openzeppelin.com)

7) Risk checklist we use at 7Block Labs before mainnet cutover

Storage layout diff clean; Slither “upgradeability” report clean; gas/perf regressions within SLO. (github.com)
7702 type‑4 and 4337 user‑ops simulated; paymaster web service complies with ERC‑7677. (eips.ethereum.org)
Rollback bundle prepared: previous impl/facet addresses recorded; pause and “revert upgrade” transactions pre‑built for Safe + Timelock.
Keys and signers: OIDC‑based KMS auth from CI; admin keys in HSM/Safe; relayer receiver whitelist enforced. (docs.aws.amazon.com)
Explorer verification scripted; artifacts attested with Cosign; SBOM archived. (blog.sigstore.dev)
SELFDESTRUCT usage audit completed (should be none). (eips.ethereum.org)

Closing thought

The 2025 baseline isn’t “push a contract and pray.” It’s automated upgrade safety checks; pre‑broadcast simulation; short‑lived credentials into KMS/HSM; multisig/AA guardrails; and an explicit rollback runbook that doesn’t depend on address reuse. If you adopt the blueprints and snippets above, you’ll ship faster—with fewer 3am incidents.

If you want a second set of eyes on your pipeline or a production rollout rehearsal, 7Block Labs can help you implement the exact stack you read here.

Sources and references

Ethereum Pectra mainnet activation details and pages; EIP‑7702 behavior and type‑4 tx. (blog.ethereum.org)
EIP‑6780 SELFDESTRUCT changes and breakages of address‑reuse patterns. (eips.ethereum.org)
EIP‑7623 calldata cost floor and implications. (eips.ethereum.org)
OpenZeppelin Upgrades plugins and docs for Hardhat/Foundry; proxy patterns. (docs.openzeppelin.com)
Safe{Core} SDK and Transaction Service; API changes. (docs.safe.global)
ERC‑6900 modular accounts; AA modularity. (eips.ethereum.org)
Slither upgradeability checks; Echidna fuzzer. (github.com)
Tenderly Simulation APIs (state overrides, bundles) and RPC. (docs.tenderly.co)
Hardhat verify; Foundry verify; Etherscan docs. (hardhat.org)
Sigstore Cosign and GitHub artifact attestations. (blog.sigstore.dev)
KMS/HSM: AWS KMS & CloudHSM secp256k1; Azure Key Vault ES256K; Vault plugin; YubiHSM 2 FIPS. (docs.aws.amazon.com)
MPC implementations and papers (Fireblocks MPC‑CMP and Coinbase). (github.com)

Note: OpenZeppelin Defender is in a managed sunset with final shutdown on July 1, 2026; plan migrations to their open‑source Relayer/Monitor or alternatives. (blog.openzeppelin.com)