Summary: Yes—7Block Labs specializes in designing, auditing, and piloting end‑to‑end verifiable voting solutions that use blockchain where it measurably improves security and transparency, without hand‑waving. This guide explains the current regulatory reality, what blockchain can and cannot fix, concrete architectures we recommend, and how we deliver low‑risk pilots that stand up to cryptographic and red‑team scrutiny.

Can You Recommend a Consulting Service with a Focus on Blockchain for Secure Voting Systems?

Decision-makers ask us this all the time: “Is there a credible way to use blockchain for voting without compromising risk, compliance, and verifiability?” The short answer: yes—but only if you pair modern cryptography (E2E verifiability, threshold decryption, mixnets or ZK) with narrowly scoped, audit‑driven deployments. Below we show what works in 2025, what still doesn’t, and how 7Block Labs helps you get real-world, defensible results.

---

The regulatory reality (United States and Europe) you must design for

• In the U.S., the EAC’s VVSG 2.0 is the current federal benchmark for certifying voting systems; first certifications under 2.0 began in July 2025 (Hart Verity Vanguard). VVSG 2.0 raises the bar for cybersecurity and accessibility—but it does not cover internet ballot return. If your plan includes online vote casting for public elections, recognize that such systems fall outside VVSG scope. (eac.gov)
• CISA, EAC, FBI, and NIST re‑released their joint “Risk Management for Electronic Ballot Delivery, Marking, and Return” memo for the 2024 cycle; it explicitly flags electronic ballot return as high risk. Expect this to be cited by risk owners and counsel. (cisa.gov)
• The National Academies’ “Securing the Vote” report remains the most‑cited research consensus in the U.S.: don’t use internet voting for high‑stakes public elections until core risks are solved. (nap.nationalacademies.org)
• Europe’s Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)5 is the only intergovernmental standard for e‑voting; if you operate in EU/EFTA, align to its secrecy, auditability, and verifiability requirements. (coe.int)

What this means for you:

• Public‑sector U.S. deployments should avoid electronic ballot return and focus on E2E‑verifiable, paper‑backed systems—or run tightly controlled pilots for defined electorates (e.g., overseas voters, internal governance) with layered mitigations.
• Private/enterprise, cooperative, association, and DAO votes have more freedom: here, advanced cryptography plus blockchain anchoring can deliver measurable trust gains.

---

What blockchain can and cannot fix in voting (with hard evidence)

Where blockchain helps:

• Tamper‑evident public bulletin boards and audit trails (anchoring hashes/commitments of ballots, proofs, and logs to a widely observed ledger).
• Decentralized trust for publishing verifiable tallies and proofs; strong timestamping (e.g., anchoring to Ethereum after EIP‑4844 reduced L2 data costs via “blobs” for rollups). (coindesk.com)
• Data availability for verifiability at scale (posting commitments/proofs to L2s using blob space, then settling on L1). (galaxy.com)

Where blockchain does not help (by itself):

• Client/device compromise, network‑level deanonymization, or server takeover during ballot casting—real attacks documented in mobile/online voting pilots (e.g., Voatz analysis). Blockchain immutability can just immutably store a manipulated vote. (usenix.org)
• Misconfigured cryptography: Russia’s Moscow pilots suffered cryptographic weaknesses that enabled vote decryption or key recovery; blockchain didn’t prevent it. (cnrs.fr)

Where the field is steadily improving:

• Switzerland re‑introduced e‑voting (limited scope) with universal verifiability, public code, and paid intrusion tests/bug bounties, reporting thousands of attacks without ballot‑box compromise. That doesn’t prove safety everywhere—but it demonstrates a process discipline worth emulating. (post.ch)

---

The 7Block Labs stance

We build verifiable voting systems where blockchain is one component in a wider, cryptographically sound architecture. For public elections, we adhere to applicable guidance (VVSG 2.0 scope, CISA risk memo). For enterprise/DAOs/associations, we maximize E2E verifiability and privacy with modern primitives and measured decentralization.

---

Architectures we actually recommend (and implement)

1. E2E‑Verifiable, Paper‑Backed In‑Person Voting (Public Sector, U.S.)

• Pattern: Paper ballots with E2E add‑on (e.g., Prêt à Voter/Scantegrity‑style receipts), mixnets or homomorphic tallying, public bulletin board anchored to a permissionless chain for proofs and logs.
• Why: Aligns with VVSG certification path while providing public verifiability and immutable audit trails. (nist.gov)

1. Remote Voting for Private/Enterprise Elections with ZK Privacy and Anti‑Coercion

• Pattern: Anonymous eligibility proofs and single‑use nullifiers using zkSNARKs; threshold homomorphic encryption for tally privacy; coordinator rotation and DKG for key ceremony; L2 data‑availability with Ethereum blob anchoring (EIP‑4844) to drive cost down. (docs.vocdoni.io)
• Why: You get receipt‑free anonymity, universal verifiability, and horizontal scalability without central trust bottlenecks.

1. DAO and Token‑Holder Governance with Anti‑Collusion Protections

• Pattern: MACI (Minimal Anti‑Collusion Infrastructure) for private on‑chain voting, coordinating off‑chain proofs with on‑chain settlement; optionally integrate zk‑census proofs or commit‑reveal with late encryption. (github.com)
• Why: Proven in grants/quadratic funding settings; great for on‑chain communities that need privacy and bribery resistance at reasonable cost.

1. Audit‑First “Bulletin Board Only” for Public Pilots

• Pattern: Keep vote capture off‑internet; publish hashes, tallies, and verification artifacts on a tamper‑evident ledger (and mirrored storage) for global witness. Use KSI‑style hash calendars or L1/L2 anchoring. (interoperable-europe.ec.europa.eu)
• Why: Gains transparency without stepping into electronic ballot return.

---

Concrete cryptographic building blocks we use (and why)

• Threshold Homomorphic Encryption (ElGamal/Paillier): lets you add encrypted ballots and decrypt only final tallies with a threshold of trustees; prevents any single party from reading intermediate results or flipping outcomes. (sciencedirect.com)
• Re‑encrypting Mixnets with ZK proofs: breaks link between voter and ballot while proving integrity of shuffles. Swiss deployments highlight the importance of publicly verifiable proofs and open code reviews. (bk.admin.ch)
• Zero‑Knowledge Eligibility and Nullifiers: zk‑census proofs ensure “one eligible voter, one counted vote” without revealing identity; nullifiers block double voting while preserving anonymity. (docs.vocdoni.io)
• Coordinator/DKG: distribute decryption power across independent trustees; rotate coordinators; require MPC ceremonies with public transcripts and audit trails.
• Anti‑Collusion Protocols (MACI): mitigates bribery and coercion by making it hard to prove how one voted while still enabling verifiable tallying. (github.com)
• Anchor and Data Availability: publish commitments, Merkle roots, and proof artifacts to robust data‑availability layers (e.g., Ethereum L2 blobs) and settle on L1 for time‑stamping and global observability. (theblock.co)

---

Lessons from real systems (what to emulate and what to avoid)

• Mobile/Internet voting apps without rigorous, public cryptographic designs (and open source) repeatedly fail under scrutiny. The MIT and Trail of Bits analyses of Voatz exposed vulnerabilities enabling vote manipulation or privacy leakage—even with a blockchain backend. Blockchain cannot compensate for client/server weaknesses. (usenix.org)
• Moscow pilots show that weak or misapplied crypto breaks privacy/integrity regardless of the ledger; researchers recovered keys and decrypted votes or inferred choices. The takeaway: fund formal crypto reviews before pilots. (cnrs.fr)
• Switzerland’s approach—universal verifiability, source disclosure, recurring public intrusion tests with substantial bounties—represents a maturing operational model. It demonstrates that verifiability, not “blockchain branding,” earns trust. (post.ch)

---

Emerging best practices we implement by default

• Internet ballot return risk assessment mapped to CISA/EAC/NIST controls; if any online return is considered, require threat‑model sign‑off by an independent panel and provide a paper or offline failover path. (cisa.gov)
• Open‑source the crypto and tally components; require third‑party cryptographers to review proofs and protocol soundness before production.
• Continuous red‑teaming and public bug bounties, not one‑off pentests; publish sanitized post‑mortems and fix logs (Swiss Post’s model, including cash rewards up to CHF 250k, is a useful benchmark). (post.ch)
• ZK circuits with public ceremonies (documented toxic‑waste handling), deterministic builds, and reproducible proof verification pipelines. (zk.vocdoni.io)
• DKG key ceremonies with diverse trustees, live‑streamed or publicly logged, with immutable proofs anchored on chain.
• Formal verification where feasible (state machines, tally circuits); static analysis and property testing for crypto code.
• Data availability via L2 blobs with post‑election archival to L1/IPFS/S3 Glacier; publish content‑addressed logs and proofs so anyone can independently re‑verify tallies. (theblock.co)

---

A pilot we’ll stand behind: what it looks like in practice

Scenario: a 75,000‑member professional association running leadership elections with secret ballots, verifiability, anti‑coercion, and public auditability.

• Identity and eligibility:
  • Use the association’s KYC/HRMS to issue one‑time anonymous voting credentials; generate zk‑census keys and publish the Merkle root before voting.
• Casting and privacy:
  • Client generates a zk proof of eligibility + nullifier; encrypts the vote under a threshold public key (ElGamal/Paillier); submits to sequencer.
  • Double‑vote prevention via nullifier set; no PII on chain.
• Tally:
  • After close, trustees run a verifiable mixnet or homomorphic tally; produce ZK proofs that outputs equal inputs, then threshold‑decrypt the final tally.
• Transparency:
  • Commitments, proofs, Merkle roots, and final tallies are posted to an L2 using blobs (cheap, ephemeral data) and settled to Ethereum L1 for timestamping; all artifacts mirrored to IPFS and cold storage. (coindesk.com)
• Audit:
  • Any member can independently verify inclusion, non‑double‑counting, and correct tally proof checks.

Expected performance envelope (recent client hardware, modest bandwidth):

• Proof generation per voter: seconds to tens of seconds depending on ballot complexity (we right‑size circuits).
• End‑to‑end vote latency: < 5 seconds to acceptance in typical L2 conditions; ~seconds to finality at L1 settlement batch close.

---

What 7Block Labs actually delivers

1. Strategy and risk workshop (2–3 weeks)

• Map your use case to regulatory posture (VVSG scope in U.S.; CoE standards in EU).
• Threat modeling (STRIDE/LINDDUN), coercion analysis, and cryptographic requirements.
• Decision memo: “internet return or not,” with CISA/EAC/NIST grounding. (cisa.gov)

1. Reference architecture and protocol selection (4–6 weeks)

• Choose between homomorphic tally + mixnet, zk‑census proof stacks, or MACI‑style anti‑collusion for DAOs.
• Ledger choice with cost model: permissioned vs. public anchor; L2 blob usage forecasts. (theblock.co)

1. Build and security engineering (8–16 weeks)

• Implement circuits, nullifier sets, sequencer/coordinator, and trustee tooling.
• Formal verification targets; deterministic builds; reproducible proof verification.

1. Open review and attack surface hardening (4–8 weeks)

• External cryptographer review; bounty program design; public intrusion test playbook modeled after Swiss practice. (post.ch)

1. Pilot execution and live audit pack (2–4 weeks)

• DKG ceremony; publication of pre‑election parameters on chain; live monitoring dashboards; post‑election audit report with machine‑checkable proofs.

1. Operations handover

• Runbooks, key rotation policies, incident playbooks, and compliance artifacts for counsel and board.

---

KPIs you should demand from any vendor (and we commit to)

• Cryptographic coverage: percentage of protocol claims backed by machine‑verifiable proofs (target: 100% of tally‑critical steps).
• Transparency: time to publish complete artifacts (parameters, proofs, roots) after close (target: under 60 minutes for medium ballots).
• Cost per vote: amortized infra + on‑chain anchoring; with blobs, sub‑$0.01 per proof artifact is achievable at scale; verify with your L2 of choice. (theblock.co)
• Red‑team robustness: bounty program engagement stats and fix SLA; public fix log.
• Independent re‑verification rate: fraction of ballots/tallies re‑verified by third parties post‑election (goal: measurable external participation).

---

Common traps—and how we help you avoid them

• “Blockchain will make it secure.” Not unless your client, server, crypto, and ops are first‑class. Voatz‑style analyses show how attackers win long before a ledger is written to. Our approach starts with crypto soundness and code transparency; the chain is your witness, not your guard. (usenix.org)
• Opaque protocols. If auditors can’t independently verify your universal verifiability proof, you don’t have verifiability. Switzerland’s 2019 experience shows that open code and public scrutiny are non‑negotiable. (bk.admin.ch)
• Over‑promising internet ballot return for public elections. CISA/EAC/NIST still call it high risk. We will not green‑light it without compensating controls and stakeholder consent on risk acceptance. (cisa.gov)

---

When blockchain is strictly optional

Some projects only need a well‑designed E2E bulletin board with authenticated append‑only logs and scheduled external anchoring (e.g., daily L1 hash commits or KSI‑style hash calendars). If that gives you the verifiability you need at lower cost/risk, we’ll recommend it. (interoperable-europe.ec.europa.eu)

---

Why 7Block Labs

• We architect to standards (VVSG scope, CoE Rec(2017)5) and to the latest, sober guidance (CISA/EAC/NIST). (eac.gov)
• We combine academic‑grade cryptography with practical L2 economics post‑EIP‑4844 to scale verification without exploding costs. (coindesk.com)
• We insist on open review and bug bounties modeled after the only live jurisdictions proving verifiability in practice. (post.ch)

If you’re exploring a secure voting system—public sector, enterprise, or DAO—let’s design a pilot that’s defensible to cryptographers, auditors, and voters alike. We’ll show you exactly where blockchain adds value, where it doesn’t, and deliver a system that stands up to hostile testing and public scrutiny.